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I. Introduction
On June 27, 1986, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or World
Court handed down a judgment on the merits in the case concerning
Military andParamilitaryActivities in andAgainst Nicaragua(Nicaragua
v. U.S.).' Notwithstanding the Court's holdings that the United States
had committed a number of violations of fundamental norms of interna-

I. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J.
1986].

14 (Merits Judgment of June 27) [hereinafter cited as Judgment of June 27,

There is a growing literature on the legal issues involved in relations between Nicaragua
and the United States, and the litigation in the Hague. For articles generally critical of United
States actions, see e.g., Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1445 (1985); and Joyner & Grimaldi, The United States and Nicaragua:
Reflections on the Lawfulness of Contemporary Intervention, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 621 (1985).
For a vigorous defense of the legality of United States actions, see Moore, The Secret War
in Central America and the Future of World Order, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (No. 1, 1986).
With respect to the Order of Interim Protection of May 10, 1984 and the Judgment on

Jurisdiction and Admissibility of November 26, 1984, a number of short articles and comments have appeared in the AM. J. INT'L L. See also Malloy, Developments at the International Court of Justice: Provisional Measures and Jurisdiction in the Nicaragua Case, 6
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 55 (1984).
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tional law, that it must pay reparation to Nicaragua, and that the U.S.
"is under a duty to immediately cease and to refrain from all such acts"
violative of these legal norms, the United States has continued to finance
and support the Nicaraguan contras (from the Spanish word "contrarevolucionario" or counterrevolutionary). By July 1986, a presidential request for an additional $100 million in overt military and other assistance
to the contras had been approved by both the Senate and the House, and
seemed assured of final passage by the Congress. 2 As a result, there
appeared to be a substantial likelihood that the United States would not,
at least initially, comply with the World Court's Judgment of June 27,
1986. Such action would contravene article 94(1) of the United Nations
Charter, which provides: "Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision3 of the International Court of Justice in
any case to which it is a party."
The Court's Judgment of June 27, 1986 was not its first decision in the
case. On April 9, 1984, Nicaragua initiated legal proceedings against the
United States in the World Court. On May 10, 1984, the Court issued an
Order of Interim Protection 4 indicating provisional measures which were
to be followed in order to protect the legal interests of the parties during
the course of the litigation. On November 26, 1984, the Court, overruling
U.S. objections, held that it had jurisdiction to decide the merits of Nicaragua's claims, and that there were no grounds of inadmissibility barring
its adjudication of the case. 5 The United States response, on January 18,
1985, was to withdraw from any participation in the merits phase of the
2. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1,paras. 292, 292(12). Regarding the decision
to seek funds for military assistance, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1986, at Al, col. 6. The
Senate passed the President's request for $70 million in military assistance and $30 million
in "humanitarian assistance" in March. After considerable maneuvering and delay, the
House passed a similar measure on June 25-only two days before the Court's decision.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 26, 1986 at At, col. 5; Washington Post, June 26, 1986, at Al,
col. 6; N.Y. Times, June 27, 1986, at A1, col. 2 (analysis of significance of House vote).
Regarding the timing of the vote in relation to the Court's decision on the merits, see
McCrory, Reason Takes a Holiday, Washington Post, June 19, 1986, at A2, col. 5. On
prospects for passage, see e.g., N.Y. Times, July 17, 1986, at A3, col. I (plans for Senate
filibuster); N.Y. Times, July 20, 1986, Sec. 1, at 12, col. 5 (passage expected). [Citations to
the N.Y. Times before August 1985 are generally to the National Edition-ED.]
3. U.N. CHARTER art. 94 para. 1.In the words of one commentator on the November
26, 1986'Judgment and subsequent U.S. response, "There can be no question that the
undertaking of compliance contained therein [i.e., art. 94(1)] is a treaty obligation at the
highest level." Highet, Litigation Implications of the U.S. Withdrawal from the Nicaragua
Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 992, 1003 (1985).
4. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 169 (Interim Protection Order of May 10) [hereinafter cited as Interim Protection
Order of May 10, 1984].
5. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility Judgment of Nov. 26) [hereinafter cited as Judgment
of Nov. 26, 1984].
FALL 1986
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proceedings. 6 Subsequently, on October 7, 1985, the United States announced its withdrawal from the compulsory jurisdiction of the World

Court, at the same time issuing statements highly critical of its handling

of the present case. 7 Such actions suggested, at least to one observer, the
possibility that the United States might not comply with an adverse final
8
judgment by the Court.
The initial reaction of the Reagan administration to the ICJ's Judgment
of June 27 indicated an apparently firm, though perhaps not final, decision
to ignore the Court's judgment on the merits. 9 At the same time, the
United States seemed to have its own legal arguments suggesting that it
was the Court, not the United States, that misunderstood the relevant
norms of international law.' 0
This article has several objectives. Its principal aim is to provide an
overview of the many complex and often controversial issues of law and
fact that have arisen in and in connection with Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States). While

it is not possible, within the space available, to adequately weigh and
evaluate competing arguments on all or even the most important ques-

tions, such an overview should be useful in identifying the critical issues
in dispute, while relating different aspects of the case to a broader context
in a manner that should facilitate further reflection and inquiry.
6. See U.S. Department of State, Statement on U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings
Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, Jan. 18, 1985, reprinted in 24
I.L.M. 246 (1985); U.S. Department of State, Observations on the International Court of
Justice's Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in the Case of Nicaragua v. United
States of America, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 249 (1985); 79 Am. J. INT'L L. 423 (1985).
7. Note from Secretary of State George P. Shultz to the Secretary General of the United
Nations, Oct. 7, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985) (notice of withdrawal from compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ); U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Oct. 7, 1985,
reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1743, 1743-45 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Press Statement of Oct. 7,
1985] (statement regarding withdrawal from compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ). See also Washington Post, Oct. 8, 1985, at Al, col. 2 (comments of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser
of the Department of State).
8. The withdrawal from the proceedings on January 18, 1985 has been characterized as
an "anticipatory repudiation" of the Charter obligation to comply with the final judgment
of the Court. Highet, supra note 3, at 1003. "It is difficult to read the departmental statement
in any serious manner other than that of advance notice that the United States does not
and will not consider itself bound by the final judgment of the Court, either under Article
59 of the Statute or Article 94 of the Charter." Id. Regarding the departmental statement,
see infra notes 36, 41 and accompanying text.
9. See N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at AI, col. 2; id. at A4, col 1; Washington Post, June
28, 1986, at 1, col. 5; id. at A14, col 3.
10. See N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at A4, col. I (U.S. reaction); Washington Post, June
28, 1986, at AI4, col. 3 (U.S. reaction). When asked if the judgment on the merits would
simply be ignored, the State Department spokesman, Charles E. Redman, replied, "After
reading the opinion, we would determine what response to that opinion, if any, is appropriate.
We consider our policy in Central America to be entirely consistent with international law."
N.Y. Times, June 28, 1986, at A4, col. I.
VOL. 20, NO. 4
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Beyond identification of the issues, this article attempts to provide a
succinct account of the decisions reached by the World Court and its
principal holdings in each. This overview, of course, cannot address in
any comprehensive manner all of the considerations weighed by the Court
in reaching a particular conclusion, the extensive literature that was available regarding certain points even before the Court's decisions, or the
full range of criticisms of the Court's holdings to be found in the dissenting
and separate opinions or in extrajudicial commentary. What the article
can and does attempt to do is to provide a coherent account of the actions
taken by the Court, in order to inform readers of the conclusions it has
reached in relation to the most important issues in a rather complicated
case.
A third aim is to provide an overview of the substantive law applicable
to the conduct of the United States in its actions vis-a-vis Nicaragua. This
treatment includes consideration of certain provisions of the U.N. and
OAS charters and other multilateral conventions. Despite the Court's
holding that it was unable to apply these multilateral treaties in deciding
Nicaragua's claims, they provide some indication of the scope of legal
arguments presented to the Court; moreover they remain legally binding
on both the United States and Nicaragua.
A fourth goal of this article is to inform readers of the responses of the
United States to the Court's decisions, particularly its Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of November 27, 1984. Here, no attempt is
made to recapitulate the arguments made by the U.S. to and rejected by
the Court. Rather, the more limited objective is to provide a summary of
the fundamental charges made by the U.S., and to offer an analysis representing the personal reaction, following considerable reflection, of one
international lawyer.
II. The Order of Interim Protection (May 10, 1984)
and U.S. Compliance
A.

THE ORDER OF INTERIM PROTECTION

Concurrently with the filing of its application or complaint against the
United States on April 9, 1984, Nicaragua requested that the Court indicate provisional measures to preserve its rights during the course of the
proceedings, in accordance with article 41 of the Court's Statute."
11. Interim Protection Order of May 10, 1984, supra note 5, at 171-72. Article 41 provides:
(I) The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require,
any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of
either party.
(2) Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given
FALL 1986
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I. Prima Facie Jurisdiction
The Court faced two basic issues in deciding this request. The first was
whether there existed a prima facie basis of jurisdiction for the Court to
decide the case. The second was, assuming that such a prima facie basis
existed, whether the circumstances alleged by Nicaragua were such as to
require the Court to indicate provisional measures to preserve the rights
of either party in accordance with article 41 of the statute of the Court.
The Court answered both of these questions in the affirmative. 12
With respect to the underlying argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the dispute, or to order interim measures of protection,
the United States made two basic arguments. The first was that Nicaragua
itself had never accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. While
under article 36(5) of the ICJ statute declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
are deemed to be acceptances of the present Court's compulsory jurisdiction, the United States argued that Nicaragua had never completed
the legal formalities necessary to bring its 1929 declaration accepting the
PCIJ's jurisdiction into force under the statute of the PCIJ. Nicaragua
had signed, but never ratified, the 1920 Protocol of Signature of the Statute
of the Permanent Court of International Justice. For its 1929 Declaration
accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ to enter into force, it
had to ratify the 1920 Protocol. While it had obtained congressional approval and even sent a cable indicating it would be depositing its instrument of ratification of the 1920 Protocol, this final step was never completed.1 3 Consequently, article 36(5) did not apply, and Nicaragua had
never accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Nicaragua, in
turn, presented arguments supporting its position that it had accepted the
ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction.
The second basic argument of the United States was that as a result of
its declaration of April 6, 1984, excluding cases involving disputes with
any Central American state for a period of two years, 14 the Court lacked
jurisdiction to hear Nicaragua's claim. Nicaragua responded by stressing
to the parties and to the Security Council.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 41, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans
1179 [hereinafter cited as I.C.J. STAT.). The statute forms an integral part of the United
Nations Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
12. Interim Protection Order of May 10, 1984, supra note 4, at 179-80, 186.
13. See Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, Dec. 16, 1920, P.C.I.J. Stat., Ser. D., No. I (4th ed.), reprinted in 4 WORLD COURT
REPORTS

II

(M.

Hudson ed.

1943); M.

HUDSON,

THE PERMANENT

COURT

OF INTERNA-

TIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-42, at 452 (1943) (ratification of Protocol required). Nicaragua might
have ratified the 1920 Protocol, however, at any time up until the dissolution of the PCIJ

in 1946. See Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984, supra note 5, at 399-404.
14. See Interim Protection Order of May 10, 1984, supra note 4, at 174-75.
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that the 1946 United States declaration accepting the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction, which contained no such reservation, provided that it could
be denounced only on six months' notice, and that therefore it remained
in effect.
While noting that it reserved any final judgment on these questions, the
Court found "that the two declarations do nevertheless afford a basis on
which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded."' 15 It then turned
to the question of whether the circumstances alleged by Nicaragua required the indication of provisional measures.
2. The Need for ProvisionalMeasures

Nicaragua argued that such interim protection was required in order to
preserve the rights of its citizens "to life, liberty and security"; its right
"to be free at all times from the use or threat of force against it by a
foreign state"; its right of sovereignty; its right "to conduct its affairs and
to determine matters within its domestic jurisdiction without interference
or intervention by any foreign state"; and "the right of self-determination
of the Nicaraguan people." The protection of these rights was an urgent
necessity, moreover, because their enjoyment was "immediately at stake,"
and because the United States, far from indicating a willingness "to desist
from its unlawful actions," was continuing to seek the resources to con16
tinue and intensify its actions.
In response, the United States made a number of arguments against
the indication of provisional measures. Several of these were suggestive
of the preliminary objections regarding the admissibility of the Nicaraguan
claim or the appropriateness of judicial action which the United States
17
was to make in the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings.
3. Order Indicating Provisional Measures

Having heard these arguments, the Court found that "the circumstances
require it to indicate provisional measures .

.

. in order to preserve the

rights claimed." In four paragraphs, the Court indicated the provisional
measures to be observed "pending its final decision in the proceedings
instituted on April 9, 1984 by the Republic of Nicaragua against the United
States of America ..
I.

"8

They were:

Unanimously,
The United States of America should immediately cease and refrain from

15. Id. at 179.
16. Id.at 182.
17. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.

18. Interim Protection Order of May 10, 1984, supra note 4, at 186.
FALL 1986
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any action restricting, blocking or endangering access to or from Nicaraguan
ports, and, in particular, the laying of mines;
2. By fourteen votes to one,
The right to sovereignty and to political independence possessed by the
Republic of Nicaragua, like any other State of the region or of the world,
should be fully respected and should not in any way be jeopardized by any
military and paramilitary activities which are prohibited by the principles of
international law, in particular the principle that States should refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or the political independence of any State, and the principle concerning the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction
of a State, principles embodied in the United Nations Charter and the Charter
of the Organization of American States;
3. Unanimously,
The Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of
Nicaragua should each of them ensure that no action of any kind is taken
which might aggravate or extend the dispute submitted to the Court;
4. Unanimously,
The Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of
Nicaragua should each of them ensure that no action is taken which might
prejudice the rights of the other Party in respect of the carrying out of
whatever decision the Court may render in the case. 19

In its Judgment of November 26, 1984, the Court stressed that "the Order
of May 10, 1984, and the provisional measures indicated therein, remain
20
operative until the delivery of the final judgment in the present case."

B. U.S.

COMPLIANCE WITH THE INTERIM ORDER

Notwithstanding the Court's Order of Interim Protection of May 10,
1984, Congress moved in the summer of 1985 to provide "humanitarian
19. Id. at 187. An Order of Interim Protection under article 41 of the Court's statute
would appear to be legally binding on the parties. See S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 124-26 (2d rev. ed. 1985); T. ELIAS, NEW HORIZONS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 78-83 (1979). While the original intentions of the drafters of article
41 of the statute of the PCIJ were ambiguous on this point (in 1920) and considerable scholarly
debate has ensued, the obligation to comply with the decision of the Court contained in
article 94(1) of the U.N. Charter, the duty to perform that and other charter obligations in
good faith in accordance with article 2(2) of the charter, and the customary law rules of

treaty interpretation embodied in articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, applied to the interpretation of article 41 as an integral part of the charter, suggest
that such orders have binding legal effect. See I.C.J. STAT. art. 41; U.N. CHARTER arts. 2
para. 2, 94 para. 1;Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31-32, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875. Regarding the scholarly debate,
see J. SZTUCKI, INTERIM MEASURES IN THE HAGUE COURT 260-94 (1983); J. ELKIND,
INTERIM PROTECTION: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (1981). See also Stein, Contempt, Crisis,

and the Court: The World Court and the Hostage Rescue Attempt, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 499
(1982). Significantly, the United States appeared to take the view in the Tehran Hostages
case that an Order of Interim Protection is legally binding. See J. SZTUCKI, supra, at
278-79.

20. Judgment of November 26, 1984, supra note 5, at 442.
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assistance" to the contras and to authorize the exchange of intelligence
information and advice with them. Although significant restrictions on
actions by the Executive were retained in the law, its adoption, and particularly the House vote which preceded it on June 12, 1985, signaled a
sharp retreat by Congress from its earlier cut-off of funding for covert
operations against Nicaragua. 2' Particularly in the House, the fear on the
part of a number of congressmen of being perceived as "soft on Communism," and the visit by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra
to Moscow shortly after an April vote in the House rejecting renewed
22
assistance to the contras were important factors producing this shift.
Several aspects of the new legislation are noteworthy. First, the 1985
Supplemental Appropriations Act of August 23 provided for $27 million in
assistance to be furnished to the contras through an agency other than
the CIA or the Defense Department. 24 The money was to remain available
for obligation through March 31, 1986. It was to be disbursed in three
equal installments, the first to be available immediately, the second following submission by the president of a report to be issued after a period
of ninety days, and the third following submission of a second presidential
report after the expiration of a second ninety-day period. The corresponding reports were to describe actions taken by the president aimed at
resolving "the conflict in Nicaragua" through negotiations and economic
measures, to include "a detailed accounting of the disbursement of any
such assistance," and to cover "alleged human rights violations by the
Nicaraguan democratic resistance and the Government of Nicaragua."
Second, the purposes for which the $27 million could be used were
limited to "humanitarian assistance." That term was defined as follows:
[Tlhe term "humanitarian assistance" means the provision of food, clothing,
medicine, and other humanitarian assistance, and it does not include the provision of weapons, weapons systems, ammunition, or other equipment, vehicles
or material which can be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death (emphasis
added).25

While the ambiguities contained in the italicized language left the president
with considerable discretion in interpreting this provision, the reporting
21. See Continuing Appropriations Act for 1985, Pub. L. 98-473, Sec. 8066, 98 Stat. 1837,
1935-37 (Oct. 12, 1984) (authorizing $24 million in assistance with restrictions, with no further
aid without Congressional authorization). A presidential request for additional funding was
defeated in the House on April 23, 1984. See, e.g., Washington Post, Apr. 24, 1985, at A],

col. 4.
22. N.Y. Times, June 13, 1985, at AI, col. 6.
23. 1985 Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 99-88, Ch. 5 and Sec. 101-Sec. 106,
99 Stat. 293, 322-29 (Aug. 15, 1985).
24. Id. at Ch. 5,99 Stat. 324-29.
25. Id. at Ch. 5, 99 Stat. 325. See Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note I, paras. 242-

43; infra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
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requirement suggested that Congress might pay careful attention to the
interpretations adopted in considering requests for additional assistance
in the future.
Third, the law provided that nothing in its provisions or in existing
prohibitions against direct or indirect aid to the contras "shall be construed to prohibit the United States government from exchanging information with the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. . . ." The current ap26
propriation-of $27 million was similarly exempted from these prohibitions.
The net effect was to leave those prohibitions in effect through fiscal year
1985, except for the $27 million in "humanitarian assistance" and the
exchange of intelligence and other information with the contras. Thus,
with these exceptions, the prohibitions on secret or back-door funding
27
remained in force.
Weakening congressional opposition to United States support of the
contras was further reflected in the 1986 Intelligence Authorization Act,
signed into law on December 4, 1985.28 This law authorized the resumption
of limited covert aid to the contras, and authorized United States intelligence agency officials to give "advice" and information, including intelligence and counterintelligence advice and information, to the contras. 29 Classified amounts were also included for "communications"
training and the development of infrastructure for the collection and exchange of information, and for the provision of communications equipment. 30 Other training of the contras, however, was prohibited, as was
31
the use of any funds not specifically approved by the Congress.

26. 1985 Supplemental Appropriations Act, supra note 23, sec. 102(b).
27. See id. Sec. 102(a)-(b).
28. See 1986 Intelligence Authorization Act, Pub. L. 99-169, 99 Stat. 1002 (Dec. 4,
1985).
29. 1986 Intelligence Authorization Act, supra note 28, secs. 102, 105; See CONF. REP.
373, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (Nov. 14, 1985) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT
on H.R. 2419].
30. CONFERENCE REPORT on H.R. 2419, supra note 29, at 15 (classified amounts for
provision of communications equipment and related training to contras).
31. 1986 Intelligence Authorization Act, supra note 28, sec. 105(a), sec. 401; CONFERENCE
REPORT on H.R. 2419, supra note 29, at 15-16. The statute also explicitly authorized the
State Department to solicit third countries to provide "humanitarian assistance" to the
contras. 1986 Intelligence Authorization Act, supra note 28, sec. 105(b) (2).
The major accomplishment of opponents of covert aid to the contras was the inclusion
of a requirement that any covert aid beyond that specifically authorized in the classified
annex to the law would require Congressional approval "of a reprogramming or of a transfer."
CONFERENCE REPORT on H.R. 2419, supra note 29, at 15-16. See 130 CONG. REC. H1029398 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1985) (remarks on CONFERENCE REPORT). See infra note 33 and

accompanying text.
On the other hand, the highly arcane language of the statute appeared to leave open a
number of possibilities for future expansion of the renewed covert assistance to the contras.
The conferees observed in their report, expanding the contemporaneous interpretation, that
VOL. 20, NO. 4
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The restrictions on assistance to the contras included in the legislation
enacted in August and December 1985 were not insignificant, and indeed
the latter made several improvements in congressional intelligence oversight procedures. Nevertheless, the net result was that, by the end of
1985, Congress had authorized the direct provision to the contras of ve-

hicles that could be used for military transport as part of the $27 million
in "humanitarian assistance," and radios that could be used to coordinate
armed attacks against and within Nicaragua under the rubric of the exchange of intelligence information and advice.
In short, the United States appeared to be involved in providing the
contras with equipment, material, and information and advice needed to
continue their war against the Sandinistas. It also appeared that whatever,
due to domestic legal prohibitions, the United States could not directly

provide, might be supplied in part by "private" and third-country financing and assistance. Such "private" and third-country aid, encouraged
by the United States, 32 could be expected to help provide some of the
weapons, ammunition, and other material which, together with United
States assistance and advice, might enable the contras to continue their
33
efforts to "pressure," or to overthrow, the government of Nicaragua.
Such "private" and third-country assistance apparently proved insufficient for the contras to successfully prosecute their war. Perhaps as a
result, the administration decided to seek a renewal of direct military
assistance in early 1986. President Reagan's request for $100 million in
additional assistance to the contras, including $70 million of military aid
the 1985 Continuing Appropriations Act authorized the provision of "transportation equipment" to the contras under the rubric of "humanitarian assistance." They also stated the
following:
[U]nder current law . . . the intelligence agencies may provide advice, including intelligence and counterintelligence advice, and information, including intelligence and counterintelligence information, to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. Section 105 does
not permit intelligence agencies to participate in activities, including training other than
communications training provided for pursuant to Section 105, that amount to participation
in the planning or execution of military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by the
Nicaraguan democratic resistance, or to participation in logistics activities integral to such
operations (emphasis added).
CONFERENCE REPORT on H.R. 2419, supra note 29, at 16. Whether participation in planning
outside of Nicaragua of such operations was prohibited was arguably ambiguous. What
degree of involvement in logistical support of military and paramilitary operations by the
contras would be deemed "integral" to such operations was a matter that would, in the
event, undoubtedly be left to the determination of the Executive.
32. See, e.g., Washington Post, Oct. 8, 1985, at A14. col. I (Reagan approval of secret
plan to replace CIA funds with private and third-country aid); Washington Post, Aug. 1I,
1985, at AI, col. 4 (NSC aide liaison to private groups).
33. See, e.g., Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1985, at A6, col. I (radio gear for contras);
Washington Post, Sept. 15, 1985, at A9, col. I (parliamentary maneuver after end of conference committee work on foreign aid bill; U.S. understandings with allies for latter to
send military aid to contras).
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and $30 million of "humanitarian assistance," appeared to be inconsistent
34
with the World Court's Order of Interim Protection of May 10, 1984.
In view of the foregoing developments, one might conclude that the
United States violated, at least after August 1985, the World Court's Order
of Interim Protection of May 10, 1986. However, a careful reading of the
second operative paragraph of the Court's order suggests that continued
United States support of the contras would not necessarily violate its
terms, provided such action could be justified as taken in lawful exercise
of the right of collective self-defense under article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. The question therefore arises whether the actions taken by the
United States against Nicaragua subsequent to May 10, 1984 can be characterized accurately under the rubric of collective self-defense. Moreover,
in view of renewed assistance to and cooperation with the contras approved by Congress in August and December 1985, one must ask whether
such action by the United States was in compliance with the injunctions
contained in operative paragraphs (3)and (4) of the ICJ's Order of Interim
Protection. The answers to these questions turn largely on the validity of
the U.S. argument that it was acting in collective self-defense, which is
considered below.
I11. Judgment on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility (November 26, 1984)
On November 26, 1984, the International Court of Justice issued a
Judgment which held that it had jurisdiction, that there was no ground of
inadmissibility that could bar its consideration of the case, and that therefore it would consider and decide on the merits the substantive issues in
the claim brought by Nicaragua against the United States. 35 On January
18, 1985, citing errors and distortions of law and fact in the Court's November 26 decision, the United States announced that it would withdraw
36
from further proceedings on the merits in the case of Nicaraguav. U.S.
In its Judgment of November 26, the Court held that it had jurisdiction
to consider and decide the merits of the case, both (I) under the compulsory jurisdiction established under article 36 paragraphs 2 and 5 of its
statute, and (2) pursuant to the compromissory clause contained in the
1956 U.S.-Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 37
34. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1986, at A21, col. 1; Washington Post, Feb. 19, 1986,
at A l, col 5.
35. Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984, supra note 5, at 442.
36. See U.S. Department of State, Statement on U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings
Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, Jan. 18, 1985, supra note 6.
37. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United States-Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024 [hereinafter cited as FCN Treaty].
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as authorized by article 36 paragraph I of the Court's statute. 38 It also
held that none of the issues of admissibility raised by the United States
39
barred the Court from considering the merits of the Nicaraguan claim.
While the Court's Judgment of November 26, 1984 has received considerable commentary, 40 it is useful to recall certain essential points, before considering the nature of the legal obligation contained in article 36(6)
of the statute of the ICJ and its broader implications.
A.

SPECIFIC ISSUES

When the United States announced its withdrawal from further proceedings on the merits of the case on January 18, 1985, it also issued
statements setting forth its reasons for withdrawing, charging broadly that:
"Each of the Court's holdings ignores or seriously misstates the evidence
4
and law relevant to the issues before the Court." '
A brief consideration of the holdings in the decision throws some light
upon this charge. Three issues of jurisdiction were considered by the
Court: (1)whether Nicaragua had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ; (2) whether the declaration filed by the United States on April
6, 1984 produced its intended effect of excluding the present case from
the United States acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction; also,
whether a reservation, known as the "multilateral treaty reservation" (or
Vandenberg Amendment), included in the United States original 1946
declaration accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, had the effect
of excluding the present case from the ICJ's jurisdiction; and (3) whether
the Court had an independent basis of jurisdiction under the terms of the
1956 U.S.-Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.
The Court also considered whether the alleged grounds of inadmissibility
adduced by the United States barred the Court's adjudication of Nicaragua's claim.
1. NicaraguanAcceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction

The question of whether Nicaragua had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice was by far the most important in the case, and the only one which produced a significant division
38. Article 36(l) provides: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the
parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations
or in treaties and conventions in force." I.C.J. STAT., art. 36(1).
39. Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984, supra note 5, at 442.
40. See supra notes 1, 3, 6; infra notes 57, 62.
41. U.S. Department of State, Observations on the International Court of Justice's Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in the Case of Nicaragua v. United States of America,
supra note 6 at 250; 79 Am.J. INT'L L. 424.
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among the judges of the Court. That question involved the interpretation
to be given to article 36(5) of the Court's statute, which provides:
Declarations made under article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the

Parties to the present Statute, to be acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run
and in accordance with their terms. (emphasis added)
Specifically, the Court was called upon to decide whether the reference
in article 36(5) to "declarations . . . which are still in force" referred only
to declarations which had become legally binding under the Statute of the
PCIJ, 42 or rather referred to declarations which in accordance with the
time limitations contained in them had not expired, and therefore in this
sense remained "in force." The latter interpretation appeared to be supported by the French text of article 36(5), which stated that "declarations
made . . . for a duration which has not yet expired shall be considered
• . . as constituting acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the duration which remains to run according to these declarations and in accordance with their terms." 43 (author's translation)
Essentially, the Court's decision upholding Nicaraguan acceptance rested
on three distinct grounds. First, the correct interpretation of the text of
article 36(5) in its context and in the light of the object and purpose of
the statute of the ICJ-confirmed by state practice reflecting agreement
as to its interpretation and by supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work- - 44 was that it covered Nicaragua's 1929
declaration. Second, in view of the overriding goal of the drafters of the
Statute to substitute the new Court for the old insofar as possible, and
without sacrificing any progress made toward the principle of compulsory
jurisdiction, Nicaragua's ratification of the new statute produced the same
effects as would have its ratification of the old, thus bringing its 1929
declaration into effect and within the terms of article 36(5). Third, Nicaragua's conduct, taking into account the publications of the Court and
the generally-held view that it was bound by the Court's compulsory
42. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
43. The complete French text reads as follows:
Les ddclarationsfaites en application de ]'article 36 du Statut de la Cour Permanente
de Justice Internationale pour une durde qui n'est pas encore expirde seront considerdes
...comme comportant acceptationde lajuridictionobligatoirede la Cour Internationale
de Justice pour la durde restant a courir d'aprds ces declarationset conformemdnt a leurs
terms (emphasis added).
I.C.J. STAT. art. 36(5) (French text). The French text is reproduced in Judgment of Nov.
26, 1984, supra note 5, at 399 (French translation of opinion).
44. See the principles of customary international law regarding treaty interpretation now
codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 19, arts. 31-33.
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jurisdiction, constituted an effective expression of its consent to be bound
by the jurisdiction of the Court under article 36(2). 45
Those voting with the majority on the question of Nicaragua's acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction included (with the respective
state of nationality in parentheses): Judges Elias (Nigeria) (President of
the Court), Sette-Camara (Brazil) (Vice-President of the Court), Lachs
(Poland), Morozov (U.S.S.R.), Nagendra Singh (India), Ruda (Argentina),
EI-Khani (Syria), de Lacharrire (France), Mbaye (Senegal), Bedjaoui
(Algeria), and Judge ad hoc Colliard (France) (appointed by Nicaragua
pursuant to article 32(2) of the Statute of the Court). 46 Dissenting votes
were received from Judges Mosler (Federal Republic of Germany), Oda
(Japan), Ago (Italy), Schwebel (United States), and Sir Robert Jennings
47
(United Kingdom).
The basic disagreement between the majority and the five dissenting
judges was ultimately the product of different interpretations of the statements in the preparatory work and prior ICJ decisions referring to existing
legal obligations or binding declarations under the Statute of the PCIJ.
The simple fact of the matter appears to be that, when making these
statements, neither the drafters of the statute nor the judges of the Court
had ever considered the highly unusual and indeed unique case of a declaration such as that of Nicaragua. According to its terms the latter was
of unlimited duration, but it had never become binding prior to 1945 due
to the failure of Nicaragua to complete the formalities necessary for ratification of the 1920 Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice. 48 In short, the case of Nicaragua was an
"unprovided-for case." Recognizing this fact, the majority looked to the
broader purposes of the Statute of the ICJ and, strictly applying customary
law principles of treaty interpretation, found three bases for holding that
Nicaragua had accepted the Court's jurisdiction, as listed above.
The dissenters, on the other hand, seemed to focus more narrowly on
the drafting history of article 36(5) itself, concluding from statements there
and in prior decisions of the Court that the drafters did not intend to
include a declaration such as that of Nicaragua within the purview of that
provision. In effect, they viewed Nicaragua's declaration as one that
indeed had been provided for by the drafters, by excluding it from the
operation of article 36(5). 49 This is certainly a point on which reasonable
45. Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984, supra note 5, at 406-15.
46. Id. at 442.
47. Id.

48. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
49. See Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984, supra note 5, at 461-65 (Mosler, J., dissenting), 47889 (Oda, J., dissenting), 522-31 (Ago, J., dissenting), 536-42 (Sir Robert Jennings, J., dissenting), 569-600 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
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and learned experts can-and did-differ. Statements in the preparatory

work and in certain previous decisions by the Court would appear, at
least at first glance, to support the views of the dissenters. On the other
hand, one criticism that could be advanced against their approach, perhaps, is that by treating an "unprovided-for case" as if it had been ad-

dressed by the drafters of the charter and the Court itself in previous
cases, the dissenters actually went beyond the evidence to be found in
the preparatory work, while attaching to it an importance which a strict
and rigorous application of the principles of treaty interpretation codified
50
in articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention would not admit.

Be that as it may, one might certainly consider the Court to have applied
those principles in a rigorous and correct manner. Its decision, in this
sense, might reasonably be interpreted as one of strict construction of the
applicable law regarding the interpretation of treaties. In any event, its
holding on the question of Nicaragua's acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction does not appear to ignore or misstate the evidence

and law, but rather merely to constitute one of several possible interpretations on an admittedly difficult issue. In this connection, it is worth
noting that in the case concerning the Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955

(U.S. v. Bulgaria),5 1 the United States had argued for an interpretation
of article 36(5) of the Statute which, relying heavily on the French text,
52
was almost identical with that adopted by the Court in the present case.

50. Such a criticism would be based on highly technical considerations relating to the
interpretation of treaties, which may only be sketched here. Recourse to supplementary
means of interpretation under article 32 of the Vienna Convention is appropriate "in order
to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the
meaning when the interpretation according to Article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous
or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 19, art. 32. However, it might be argued,
the meaning of article 36(5) can be deduced from the application of article 31(1) and article
31(3) of the Vienna Convention. Although recourse to supplementary means of interpretation
such as the preparatory work appears appropriate in the present case, it could be argued
that the evidence found there is inconclusive at best, and should not be marshaled to overturn
an interpretation resulting from the application of article 31 (,)and article 31(3). See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 19, arts. 31-33.
51. See, e.g., P.
JURISPRUDENCE

DE

EISEMAN,
LA

COUR

V.

COUSSIRAT-COUSTERE,

INTERNATIONALE

& P. HUR, PETIT MANUEL DE LA
81-85 (3d. ed. 1980). For the

DE JUSTICE

principal decision, see Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), 1959 I.C.J. 127
(Preliminary Objections Judgment of May 26).
52. See Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 (U.S. v. Bulgaria), 1959 I.C.J. Pleadings 301,
319-21 (U.S. Countermemorial of Feb. 1960) (Preliminary Objections) [hereinafter cited as
U.S. Countermemoriall. Bulgaria's acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the PCIJ,
which had been legally binding under the old Statute, had lapsed when the PCIJ was dissolved
in 1946. Nonetheless, the United States argued that the words "in force" referred to the
period of time for which the declaration was to remain operative. Rejecting Bulgaria's
contention that its 1921 declaration of unlimited duration had not been "in force" when
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Finally, both the United States and Nicaragua appear to have assumed,
prior to April 9, 1984, that Nicaragua had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. 53 Since by the terms of its declaration the United
States had undertaken to terminate its declaration only on six month's
notice, Nicaragua could arguably have filed a declaration accepting the
Court's compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2) even after the United
States' objections became known. Its decision not to do so was probably
the result of tactical considerations-to take such action after April 9,
1984 would have required a recommencement of the action by filing a new
application if it wished to rely on the new declaration, and doing so might
have forfeited the tactical advantage gained by taking the offensive. In
the end, Nicaragua's decisions were good enough since the Court held
that Nicaragua had indeed accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. U.S. Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction
The remaining issues considered by the Court are of secondary importance, and need only be mentioned here. Among them was whether the
United States had itself accepted the compulsory jurisdiction on the Court,
in view of its attempted modification of the terms of its acceptance on
April 6, 1986, and in view of the so-called multilateral treaty reservation
(Vandenberg Amendment). Several highly technical arguments regarding

Bulgaria became a party to the Statute of the ICJ in 1955, the United States stated:
The United States Government believes that this is not the proper interpretation of

Article 36, paragraph 5. The intended and effective meaning of the words "still in force"
is to be seen in the French text of the provision: "pour une durde qui n'est pas encore

expirde." The declarations referred to in Article 36, paragraph 5 were those made for a
duration not yet expired. As applied to the Bulgarian declaration of 1921, the import of
Article 36, paragraph 5 is clear: when Bulgaria became a party to the Statute of the Court,
no period had come to an end within which the Bulgarian declaration was limited, for,
as we have seen, the declaration of 1921 was without limit of time.
Id. at 319.

While the Court had rejected this argument, over a vigorous dissent, in the case of Aerial
Incident of 27 July 1955 (Israel v. Bulgaria), supra note 51, the important point is that the

Court's reading of article 36(5) in the present case was not arbitrary and capricious, as
suggested by the fact that the United States had itself urged the Court to adopt a very similar
interpretation of that provision in the past-after the ICJ's decision in Israel v. Bulgaria.
The U.S. discontinued the proceedings against Bulgaria on May 13, 1960, as a result of

Bulgaria's invocation of the Connally reservation to the U.S. declaration under article 36(2)
of the statute, and of U.S. reconsideration of its interpretation of that reservation. 1960
I.C.J. Pleadings 676-77.
53. Had Nicaragua simply filed a declaration with the Secretary General of the United

Nations reaffirming its acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction under article 36(2), effective
immediately, the whole question would have been moot. This it might have done immediately
prior to filing its application, as Portugal had done in the Right of Passage case. See Right
of Passage Over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 127, 141, 145-47 (Preliminary
Objections Judgment of Nov. 26). Or it might have filed such a declaration after the United
States made clear that it would question the validity of Nicaragua's acceptance.
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rights asserted by the United States to immediately terminate its acceptance, or to invoke under the principle of reciprocity a similar right allegedly held by Nicaragua were also advanced; however, they were firmly
rejected by almost all of the judges. The Court held, by a division of
13-3, 54 that the United States was bound by its compulsory jurisdiction
when Nicaragua initiated proceedings on April 9, 1984, particularly in
view of the six-month notice requirement contained in its original dec55
laration of 1946.
With respect to the so-called multilateral treaty reservation, the Court
held that it could only determine its reach in the merits phase of the
proceedings, and that, in any event, it could not prevent the Court from
deciding the case on the basis of customary international law. That reservation excepted from the United States acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction
disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty
affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the
United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction.

56

The United Nations Charter, the OAS Charter, and two other conventions,
in addition to customary international law, had been relied upon by Nicaragua as a basis for its claim. Whether the Court might rely on these
treaties in deciding the case was reserved for final decision in its Judgment
57
on the Merits.

54. Only one vote was taken on the issue of whether the Court had compulsory jurisdiction
to decide the case. All five dissenting judges dissented on the issue of Nicaraguan acceptance
of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. The
13-3 division on the issue of U.S. acceptance of that jurisdiction is readily apparent from
an analysis of the dissenting opinions. See Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984, supra note 5, at 51013 (Oda, J., dissenting), 548-55 (Sir Robert Jennings, J., dissenting), 600-28 (Schwebel, J.,
dissenting). Of particular interest is the fact that each of the dissenting judges disagreed
with the Court's opinion on the question of U.S. acceptance of the ICI's compulsory
jurisdiction on a different ground.
55. Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984, supra note 5, at 415-21, 442.
56. See id. at 421-26.
57. Id. The two other treaties were the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and
Duties of States, and the 1928 Havana Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in
the Event of Civil Strife. Id. at 422.
The multilateral treaty reservation does not appear to have been framed in order to deal
with a case such as that before the Court. See Kirgis, Nicaragua v. United States as a
Precedent, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 652, 654-55 (1985). The Court held only that the reservation
could not operate as a bar to exercising jurisdiction, leaving open the question of its applicability in deciding the case on the merits. Professor Briggs has criticized this aspect of
the Court's decision, as follows:
The Court was correct in holding further (paras. 67-76) that the Vandenberg multilateral
treaty reservation was no bar in limine litis to consideration of Nicaragua's claims, but
it appears unfortunate that the Court dismissed it as not exclusively of a preliminary
character rather than holding, for example, that it is not the function of the Court to make
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3. Jurisdiction under the Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation Treaty

A separate issue was whether the Court might exercise jurisdiction on
the basis of the compromissory clause contained in the 1956 U.S.-Nic-

aragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN Treaty).
By a vote of 14-2, the Court held that it had jurisdiction under the clause
to decide disputes between the parties as to whether the FCN Treaty
could be applied to the facts of the present case. 58 The question of the
applicability of the Treaty was therefore left to be decided in the Judgment
59
on the Merits.
4. Admissibility

In addition to its arguments that the Court lacked jurisdiction, the United
States also argued that Nicaragua's claim was not "admissible" and that

therefore it would be improper for the Court to decide the case. 60 The

sense of a reservation that by its terms in nonsensical.
Briggs, Nicaragua v. United States: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 373,
378 (1985). The multilateral treaty reservation, it should be noted, has no application to the
FCN Treaty and decision under the latter's compromissory clause in accordance with article
36(l) of the Statute of the ICJ. For the Court's holding on the effect of the multilateral
treaty reservation in its judgment on the merits, see infra notes 111-14 and accompanying
text.
58. Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984, supra note 5, at 426-29, 442. Judge Ruda (who voted with
the Court on the issue of compulsory jurisdiction) and Judge Schwebel dissented. See id.
at 453-54 (Ruda, J., dissenting), 628-37 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
59. This holding has been criticized on the ground that the Court should not have decided
to exercise jurisdiction under the terms of the FCN Treaty because it is clearly commercial
in nature. See Kirgis, supra note 57, at 656-57.
However, it is clear that a dispute over whether the treaty applied to the facts of the case
existed between the parties, and the Court could not have reached a different decision
without consideration of the merits, which would not have been proper in the preliminary
objections stage of the proceedings.
60. The United States advanced five separate grounds of inadmissibility which, in its
view, either operated as a legal bar to adjudication or required the Court to decline the case
as "a matter requiring the exercise of discretion in the interest of the integrity of the judicial
function." These grounds were:
* The absence of indispensable parties meant that a decision by the Court would infringe
their rights, particularly that of self-defense, if they were not parties to the proceedings
* The Court could not properly decide the case because Nicaragua's claim dealt with the
illegal use of force, a breach of the peace, or acts of aggression, matters whose resolution
had been committed by the United Nations Charter to other organs, particularly the
Security Council
* Similarly, the subject matter of the dispute was inappropriate for decision by the Court
due to its position within the United Nations system, which entrusted such decisions to
the political organs of the United Nations in cases involving the ongoing exercise of "the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense" under article 51 of the Charter;
moreover, an ICJ decision on the merits would constitute in effect a decision on an appeal
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International Court of Justice, by a unanimous vote, rejected each of the
five asserted grounds of inadmissibility. 6 1 Judge Schwebel of the United
States joined the remaining members of the Court in their decision that
the arguments of the United States regarding inadmissibility were without
merit. This result was not surprising in the light of the previous holdings
of the Court, including its decision in the case of UnitedStates Diplomatic
and Consular Staff in Tehran in which the6 2United States had taken sharply
different views of many of these issues.
B.

POINTS OF CRITICISM

The Court's Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility has been criticized by the United States 63 and others 64 on a number of grounds. In
the legal realm, three criticisms have been particularly salient. First, the
Court's holding that Nicaragua had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ has been strongly criticized as contrary to the intentions of the
drafters of the Statute and inconsistent with previous decisions of the

from an adverse determination in the Security Council
* The case was inadmissible due to the inability of the judicial function to deal with situations
involving ongoing conflict without overstepping its proper bounds, among other reasons,
because the Court could not ascertain the legally relevant facts "establishable in conformity
with applicable norms of evidence and proof"; and
* Nicaragua had failed to exhaust the established processes for the resolution of disputes
arising in Central America, in particular the Contadora peace process. Judgment of Nov.
26, 1984, supra note 5, at 429-41.
61. Id. at 440-42.
62. See id. at 434, 436-37, 439-40. While the issues of admissibility are of minor importance, as reflected by the Court's unanimous rejection of each of the United States' contentions, the Reagan administration has relied heavily on admissibility arguments in its
criticisms of the Court's Nov. 26, 1984 Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility. For an
insightful treatment of these issues, with specific reference to analogous issues in U.S. law,
see Chayes, supra note 1. Chayes, a former legal adviser of the State Department, has
served as Agent of Nicaragua in the present case.
Another aspect of the case has also been the subject of considerable commentary. When
El Salvador attempted to intervene in the jurisdictional phase of the proceedings under
article 63 of the statute of the Court, in an apparent effort to argue that the Court lacked
jurisdiction as between the U.S. and Nicaragua, the Court rejected the Salvadoran declaration by a vote of 14-1, insofar as it related to the present stage of the proceedings. By a
closer vote of 9-6, the Court decided not to grant El Salvador an oral hearing. The latter
decision has been criticized. For a thorough assessment of this incident, see Sztucki, Intervention Under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute: The Salvadoran "Incident", 79 AM. J. INT'L
L. 1005 (1985). For the Court's decision, see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.), Declaration of Intervention of El Salvador, 1984,
I.C.J. (Order of Oct. 4), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 38 (1985). See also Judgment of June 27,
1986, supra note 1, (Separate Opinion of Judge Lachs) (denial of hearing a judicial error,
but without prejudice to main case).
63. See supra note 6.
64. See e.g., Moore, supra note I, at 92-102; infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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Court. 65 Second, the Court's failure to dismiss those of Nicaragua's claims
that were brought under. the Court's compulsory jurisdiction has been
criticized as a failure to give full and proper effect to the multilateral treaty
reservation at the preliminary objections or jurisdictional stage of the
proceedings. While the Court reserved its final decision on this issue for
its judgment on the merits, it did state that it could not dismiss Nicaragua's
claims under customary international law simply because the corresponding legal norms had been enshrined in the texts of the multilateral conventions relied on by Nicaragua. 66 Third, the decision has been criticized
for its holding that differences over the meaning and application of the
FCN Treaty came within the terms of the compromissory clause and
67
should therefore be decided in the merits stage of the proceedings.
A counterargument to these criticisms might be found in the fact that
the Court carefully considered the arguments of the parties in reaching
its decision, and in the text of article 36(6) of the statute of the Court,
which provides, "In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court. ' 68
However, before considering the response of the United States to the
ICJ's Judgment of November 26, 1984, the World Court's Judgment on
the Merits will be examined..
IV. Judgment on the Merits (June 27, 1986)
A.

BACKGROUND: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW AND ARGUMENTS

Nicaragua argued to the Court that the United States had breached the
basic provisions of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the
Organization of American States prohibiting the threat or use of force or
intervention in the internal affairs of another state, as well as the corresponding provisions of customary international law. Although the Court
ultimately held that it could not rely on these conventions due to the
multilateral treaty reservation of the United States, these conventional
norms merit brief consideration because they were invoked by Nicaragua,
and the United States never argued that it was not bound by these treaty
obligations, but rather only that the Court was not competent to apply
them or to decide the underlying issues in the present case. 69 Although
65. See supra notes 6, 49; Moore, supra note 1,at 95-96.
66. See Judgment of November 26, 1984, supra note 5,at 423-25.
67. See, e.g., Kirgis, supra note 57.
68. I.C.J. STAT. art 36(6).

69. See Judgment of June 27, 1986 at para. 15 (invoked by Nicaragua); id. at paras. 3334 (U.S. did not argue international law not controlling); Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984, supra
note 5, at 436-37 (U.S. did not argue international law not directly relevant, nor that case
was inadmissible since dealt with "political" and not "legal" question).
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the United States was not present to put forth its position that its actions
were justified as an exercise of the right of collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Court considered
it. Article 51 is also discussed in the following.
1. The Prohibitionof the Threat or Use of Force

The cornerstone of the United Nations Charter is the prohibition against
the threat or use of force across international frontiers. This prohibition
is expressed in article 2 paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter in the
following terms:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
70
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

At the same time, article 20 of the OAS Charter provides as follows:
The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily,
of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State,
71
directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever . . . [emphasis added].

72
The preceding prohibitions also exist in customary international law.

2. The Principle of Nonintervention

The principle of nonintervention is not spelled out in the United Nations
Charter, although it is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality
of states 73 and intervention by the use of force is specifically prohibited

by article 2(4). Article 18 of the OAS Charter, on the other hand, is more
specific, providing as follows:
No State or Group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force, but also any other form

70. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 para. 4. Similarly, article I of the Rio Treaty establishes:
The High Contracting Parties formally condemn war and undertake in their international
relations not to resort to the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or of this Treaty.
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, art. 1, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S.
No. 1838, 4 Bevans 559 [hereinafter cited as Rio Treaty].
71. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S.
No. 2361, amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, art. 20, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847
[hereinafter cited as OAS Charter].
72. Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Principle
I (Prohibiting the Threat or Use of Force), para. 8, Principle 3 (Duty of Non-Intervention)
G.A. Res. 2625, 25 GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Declaration on Friendly Relations]; Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, paras. 187208.
73. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2 para. I.
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of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against
74
its political, economic and cultural elements (emphasis added).

This prohibition also exists under customary international law as part of
75
the duty of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of another state.
An examination of authoritative interpretations of relevant legal norms
that have been made by the United States and other Members of the
United Nations in the past provides further specifics regarding the duty
of nonintervention. The General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Friendly
Relations, adopted by consensus and with the support of the United States,
contained the following language as part of an authoritative interpretation
of article 2(4):
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for in76
cursion into the territory of another State.

This clarification of the reach of article 2(4) was agreed to without a
dissenting vote. It now constitutes both an agreed interpretation of article
2(4), 7 7 and a rule of customary international law. 78 The United States has

repeatedly reaffirmed the principle contained in the paragraph quoted
above.

79

In addition to the foregoing clarification, the Declaration on Friendly
Relations also reiterated the prohibition of intervention in the domestic
affairs of any state, as follows:
74. OAS Charter, supra note 71, art. 18.
75. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 72, Principle 3 (Duty of Nonintervention). See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
76. Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 72, Principle I (Prohibiting the Threat
or Use of Force), para. 8.
77. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 19, art. 31(3). The Committee which elaborated the text of the Declaration, beginning in 1963, worked in general
on the basis of unanimity. Rosenstock, The Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713, 713-14 (1971). Rosenstock
characterizes the Declaration as:
the most important single statement representing what the Members of the United Nations
agree to be the law of the Charter on these seven principles ....
The principles involved
...are acknowledged by all to be principles of the Charter. By accepting the respective
texts, states have acknowledged that the principles represent their interpretations of the
obligations of the Charter. The use of the word "should" rather than "shall" in those
instances in which the Committee believed it was speaking de legeferenda [i.e., in terms
of progressive development of law or law-in-the-making, which has not yet crystallized
into customary law] or stating mere desiderata further supports the view that the states
involved intended to assert binding rules of law where they used language of firm obligation.
Id. at 714-15.
78. See e.g., B. DOHNE, DIE GRUNDPRINZIPIEN DES VOLKERRECHTS UIBER DIE FREUNDSCHAFrLICHEN BEZIEHUNGEN UND DIE ZUSAMMENARBEIT
ZWISCHEN
DEN STAAT EN 5961, 103 (1973); supra note 77 and accompanying text; Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra
note 1, paras. 188-91, 202-10.
79. See e.g., Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defense in Modern International Law, 136 RECUEIL DESCOURs 411, 456, 458-60, 482, 482 (1972-11).
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No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or its political, economic
and cultural elements, are in violation of international law.
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other
type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages
of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or
tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent
overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another
State.
Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social
and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State.

While the outer limits of the duty of nonintervention have not yet been

clearly defined, the prohibition against interference in the domestic affairs
of another state now forms a part of the law of the Charter and also of
80
customary international law.
3. The Right of Individual
or Collective Self-Defense

Actions involving prima facie violations of the foregoing prohibitions
may nonetheless be lawful if they can be justified as undertaken in exercise
of the right of individual or collective self defense under article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. Article 51 provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of self-defence
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in
any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security (emphasis added). 81

A right of self-defense at least as broad as that recognized by article 51
also exists under customary international law.
There are three essential prerequisites for the lawful exercise of the
right of self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. First, the state
exercising the right must either itself be the victim of "an armed attack"
by the state against which measures of self-defense are taken, or be re80. See Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 72, Principle 3 (Duty of Nonin-

tervention); supra notes 72, 77, and accompanying text. For the Court's holding on this
point, see Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note I, paras. 191-92, 202-209, 239-45.
81. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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sponding to a request for assistance in exercise of the right of collective
self-defense extended by the state which is a victim of an armed attack.
There has been considerable debate, however, over what exactly is required to constitute an armed attack within the meaning of article 51.82
Second, lawful exercise of the right must be both necessary to halt the
attack in question and proportionate to the threat which such an attack
represents. These limitations are inherent in the very concept of self83
defense, and correspond to similar requirements found in domestic law.
The final requirement, under the United Nations Charter, is that measures of self-defense "shall be immediately reported to the Security Council." 84 This requirement is of critical importance, for only if it is satisfied

can the Security Council identify violations of article 2(4), assess the
appropriateness of measures taken in alleged self-defense, and adopt measures necessary to restore international peace and security. However,
unlike the first two requirements, the third does not exist under customary
international law-where strong institutional links to United Nations machinery are absent.
4. Key Issues of Fact and Law to be Decided
by the Court in the Judgment on the Merits

The basic position of the United States with respect to the merits stage
of the proceedings was that the Court was improperly seized of the case
and therefore should not proceed to a decision on the merits. 85 Although
82. See e.g., Malanczuk, Countermeasures and Self-Defense as Measures Precluding
Wrongfulness in the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility,
43

ZEITSCHRIFT

RJR AUSL..NDISCHES

OFFENTLICHES

RECHT

UND

VOLKERRECHT

705,

756-

59 (1983).
83. The requirements of necessity and proportionality were fully developed in customary
international law prior to the advent of the U.N. Charter. An authoritative statement of
these principles was made, for example, in diplomatic correspondence in The Caroline case
in 1841 and 1842. In the words of U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster, Great Britain
could justify its actions in U.S. territory only if it could show:

[the] necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and
no moment for deliberation. It will be for it to show, also, that the local authorities of
Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act
justified by the necessity of self-defense must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly
within it.
Quoted in I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 42-43
(1963). Regarding the requirements of an armed attack, a request for assistance, necessity
and proportionality, see Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, paras. 193-200.
84. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. But see Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, para. 200
(reporting requirement not a part of customary law of self-defense).
85. See supra note 6; infra note 145-46 and accompanying text.
Although the United States did not participate in the merits phase of the proceedings,
and therefore did not file a memorial addressing the substantive issues, it did publish certain
documents setting forth its views of the facts. See DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REVOLUTION
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the U.S. did not fully articulate its views on the substantive issues of law
and fact due to its nonparticipation in the proceedings on the merits, it
is still possible to identify basic differences which necessarily existed
between Nicaragua and the United States with respect to certain critical
substantive issues of fact and law.
One issue was the degree to which Nicaragua had in fact supplied arms
and other military assistance to the guerrillas in El Salvador, particularly
since 1981. A second issue was whether, assuming arms shipments from
Nicaragua to the Salvadoran guerrillas had taken place, such actions gave
rise to a right of collective self-defense by the United States to assist El
Salvador in bringing such actions to a halt. Third, a number of questions
existed with respect to whether the United States had satisfied other
conditions necessary for the lawful exercise of the right of self-defense,
particularly the requirements of necessity and proportionality in any defensive response involving the use of force. Fourth, there was the question
of whether the actions of the contras were legally imputable to the United
States, i.e., whether the U.S. exercised such direction and control over
their activities as to make them in effect its agents, with the legal consequence that their acts could be attributed to the United States for purposes of legal responsibility.
The Court answered these and a number of other questions in its Judgment on the Merits of June 27, 1986. The following provides a brief
examination of that decision highlighting its essential points.
B.

THE COURT'S JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS OF JUNE

27, 1986

On June 27, 1986, the International Court of Justice handed down its
Judgment on the Merits 86 in what will surely be viewed as a landmark
decision. On all major substantive issues relating to the use of force and
BEYOND OUR BORDERS: SANDINISTA INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA (1985). This
document was made available to the Court on Sept. 13, 1985. See Judgment of June 27,
1986, supra note 1, at para. 73. See also DEPARTMENT OF STATE & DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, BACKGROUND PAPER: NICARAGUA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP AND SUPPORT FOR
CENTRAL AMERICAN SUBVERSION (July 18, 1984). Cf. Moore, supra note I. The United

States did inform the Court in general terms that it viewed its actions in Central America
as consistent with the provisions of the U.N. Charter, and that,
[p]ursuant to the inherent right of collective self-defense, and in accord with its obligations
under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the United States has provided
support for military activities against forces directed or supported by Nicaragua as a
necessary and proportionate means of resisting Nicaraguan military and paramilitary acts
against its neighbors, pending a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
Quoted in Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, Schwebel, J., dissenting, para. 192.
See also Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note I, para. 187 (U.S. views customary law
norms governing use of force as identical to those of the U.N. Charter); supra notes 72,
75, 76, 79 and accompanying text.
86. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, para. 292.
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intervention, the Court reached its decisions with the concurrence of at least
twelve of the fifteenjudges. Although Judge Oda of Japan and Judge Sir Robert Jennings of the United Kingdom did join Judge Schwebel of the United
States in voting against the Court's holdings regarding the use of force and
intervention, they did so on jurisdictional grounds; Judge Sir Robert Jennings also voiced certain reservations about the Court's statement of the law
governing collective self-defense, without, however, expressing any view
that the actions of the United States werejustified in the present case on that
ground. 87 At the same time, the Court held by votes of 14-1, with only Judge
Schwebel dissenting, that the United States had violated the 1956 U. S.-Nicaragua FCN Treaty by mining Nicaraguan harbors. By a vote of 12-3, it also
found the U.S. had violated the Treaty by directly attacking certain targets,
88
and by imposing a general trade embargo.
1. The Multilateral Treaty Reservation
In fact, the only major division between the judges of the Court was
over the effect to be given to the multilateral treaty reservation contained
in the United States 1946 declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under article 36(2) of its statute. The Court held, by a
vote of 11-4, that El Salvador would be "affected" by a decision based
on application of multilateral treaties including the U.N. and OAS charters, that therefore the reservation precluded reliance on these treaties in
deciding the case, but that Nicaragua's claims might properly be decided
under customary international law, general principles of law, and the 1956
U.S.-Nicaragua FCN Treaty. 89 The four voting against the majority on
this point were of the view that the reservation should be given no application in the present case. 90 On the other hand, Judges Oda, Schwebel,
and Sir Robert Jennings, while voting in favor of the applicability of the
multilateral treaty reservation, went on to conclude that application of
the reservation barred the Court from adjudicating those of Nicaragua's
claims which were based on the Court's jurisdiction under article 36(2)
of the statute. 91 Significantly, the disagreement of Judges Oda and Sir
Robert Jennings with the majority on the major issues relating to U.S.
violations of the customary international law norms prohibiting the use
87. See id. at paras. 292(2)-(6), 292(12)-(13); id. (Sir Robert Jennings, J., dissenting) (Oda,
J., dissenting) (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
88. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, at paras. 292(7), 292(11), 292(14).
89. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note I, at paras. 42-56, 292.
90. See Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note I, (Separate Opinion of Judge Ruda),
(Separate Opinion of Judge Elias), (Separate Opinion of Judge Sette-Camara), (Separate
Opinion of Judge Ni).
91. See Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, (Oda, J., dissenting), (Schwebel, J.,

dissenting), (Sir Robert Jennings, J., dissenting).
FALL 1986

1272

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

of force and intervention in the affairs of another state was based on this
jurisdictional ground; neither expressed agreement with the views of Judge
Schwebel or the United States to the effect that U.S. actions in the instant
92
case were legally justified.
2. Evaluation of the Evidence
The International Court of Justice employed a cautious approach in its
evaluation of the evidence. 93 Proceeding under article 53 of the statute,
which requires the Court, when the respondent does not appear, "to
satisfy itself . . . that the claim is well-founded in fact and law," 94 the
Court stated that it had treated "documentary material (press articles and
various books)" with caution, regarding such sources as not capable of
establishing facts, but as material which can nonetheless contribute to
the corroboration of a fact and be taken into account to show certain facts
are public knowledge. Regarding "statements by representatives of States,"
the Court considered them to have particular probative value when they
acknowledged facts or conduct unfavorable to the state concerned. With
respect to "evidence of witnesses -- Nicaragua presented five who gave
oral evidence as well as a written affidavit by another-the Court stated
that it had not treated opinion as evidence, but only statements regarding
facts directly known by the witness concerned; with respect to "affidavits
or sworn statements" made by members of a Government, the Court
stated that it could rely on admissions against interest, but that for the
rest such evidence had to be treated with great reserve. 95 Finally, the
Court stated that in view of the special circumstances of the case, it might,
within limits, make use of a U.S. State Department publication entitled
Revolution Beyond Our Borders: Intervention in Central America, despite
the fact that it had not been submitted to the Court in any form or manner
96
contemplated by the latter's Statute and Rules.
3. Finditgs of Fact
Having, set forth its guidelines for the evaluation of evidence, the Court
made a rumber of factual determinations relating both to U.S. conduct
vis-A-vis Nicaragua and the contras, and Nicaraguan conduct vis-A-vis
neighboring states, particularly El Salvador. The findings of fact on which

92. Se( id. (Oda, J.,dissenting), (Sir Robert Jennings, J.. dissenting); supra note 87 and

accu"-

nying text.

93. But see Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, (Schwebel, J. dissenting) (strong
disagreement with the proposition in the text).
94. I.C.J. STAT. art. 53.
95. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, at paras. 27-31, 59-72.
96. Id. at para. 73. See supra note 85.
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the Court's holdings regarding United States violations of international
law were based are set forth in the discussion of those holdings below.
Worth noting here is the fact that the ICJ rejected Nicaragua's factual
allegations on a number of 97
points as not being clearly established by the
evidence before the Court.

Of particular importance was the Court's finding that the Nicaraguan
charges that the contra forces had been created, and had been directed
and controlled by the United States to such a degree as to make them,
in effect, its agents, were not clearly established by the evidence. 98 Significantly, the Court also found that support of the guerrillas in El Salvador
by military aid arriving from Nicaraguan territory up to the early months
of 1981 could be reasonably inferred. The Court held, however, that it
could not be assumed that shipment of such military aid was imputable
to Nicaragua; and that the evidence before it was insufficient to establish
that the government of Nicaragua was itself directly responsible for the
flow of arms to El Salvador, either before br after early 1981. With respect
to such arms shipments after 1981, the Court found that the evidence was
very weak. While it could not conclude that there had been no transport
of arms after early 1981, the Court stated that it could not satisfy itself
that any continuing flow on a significant :scale took place after the early
months of 1981.

99

The Court also found that certain cross-border attacks on Honduras
and Costa Rica were imputable to Nicaragua, while also noting that antiSandinista forces were active along both borders. 10 0 Although the ICJ

held that these incursions could not be relied upon as justifying the exercise of the right of collective self-defens, 101 its findings of fact regarding
these incursions and the shipment of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador

97. See generally id. at paras. 75-171 (findings of fact).
98. Id. at paras. 93-116.
99. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note I, at paras. 130-60. One of the costs paid by
the United States by not participating in the proceedings on the merits seems to have been
forfeiting the opportunity to present the evidence, possibly quite strong, supporting its claim
that Nicaragua was responsible for the arms shipments to El Salvador prior to 1981. At the
same time, however, one of the benefits of nonparticipation may have been the ability to
avoid official confirmation that the evidence of arms shipments since 1981 is in fact quite
weak.
100. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, at paras. 161-64.
101. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, at para. 231. The Court's finding that
neither Honduras nor Costa Rica had requested U.S. assistance in meeting an armed attack
was the most obvious basis for this holding. While the Court did not go into detail on any
additional factors, other than observing that anti-Sandinista forces were active along both
borders, it seems possible that it may have also viewed the cross-border incursions or alleged
arms shipments as not giving rise to the right of self-defense either because they did not
constitute an armed attack or because they had ceased. See Judgment of June 27, 1986,
supra note I, at paras. 131, 161-66, 231-34, 238.
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suggested that had Costa Rica, Honduras, or El Salvador joined the litigation and filed a counterclaim or counterclaims against Nicaragua, the
World Court would have been fully prepared to evaluate impartially all
evidence submitted, and indeed to hold that Nicaragua had violated international law by such transborder incursions or the supply of material
to armed bands in Honduras or Costa Rica-if the evidence supported
such charges and Nicaraguan actions could not be justified as an exercise
of the right of self-defense.
The Court did not specifically find that Nicaragua had violated international law because no charges had been brought before the Court against
Nicaragua. Several of its findings of fact, however, suggested that it might
well have held that Nicaragua had violated international law had it been
asked to do so. 102
4. Violations of Customary InternationalLaw

The Court's articulation of the basic principles of customary international law governing the use of force, intervention in the internal affairs
of another state, and related questions achieved a clarity that will not
only put to rest a number of doctrinal disputes, but also stand for years
to come as the most authoritative statement of the content of contemporary international law relating to these issues. As a statement of existing
customary law, the Court's holdings are directly relevant to the interpretation of the U.N. Charter and other treaties whose prohibitions must be
construed at least as broad as to encompass obligations under customary
law. The Court's Judgment of June 27, 1984 will undoubtedly receive great
attention from international lawyers, students, foreign affairs specialists,
and others throughout the world. However, it is primarily what the Court
held in relation to the U.S. violations of international law charged by
Nicaragua that is of the greatest and most immediate concern in the
context of the present article. While no short treatment can do justice to
the Court's opinion, its principal holdings are briefly summarized below.
a. The Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force
With respect to United States actions against Nicaragua and in support
of the contras, the World Court held that the U.S. had violated the customary international law prohibition against the threat or use of force by
102. Particularly with respect to Nicaraguan government responsibility for arms shipments to El Salvador in 1980-81, it seems possible that the evidence would have supported
such a conclusion had it been properly introduced and pleaded to the Court as part of a
counterclaim. Regarding allegations of Nicaraguan involvement in infiltrating armed bands
into Honduras, which could not be justified as an exercise of the right of self-defense, see
Moore, supra note 1, at 59.
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directly attacking Nicaragua-through the actions of its officials and individuals acting on its behalf-in a number of instances. These included:
(1) the laying of mines in Nicaraguan internal or territorial waters in
1984;103 (2) attacks on an underwater oil pipeline at Puerto Sandino on
September 13, 1983 and October 10, 1983; (3) an air and sea attack on
the port of Corinto on October 10, 1983 causing the destruction of oil
storage tanks, the loss of millions of gallons of fuel, and the evacuation
of large numbers of the local population; (4) an attack by speedboats and
helicopters using rockets against the Potosf Naval Base, on January 4-5,
1984; (5) an attack on March 7, 1984 by speedboats and helicopters on
an oil storage facility at San Juan del Sur; (6) clashes between speedboats
and a helicopter and Nicaraguan patrol boats at Puerto Sandino, during
minelaying operations on March 28-30, 1984; and (7)fire support provided
by a helicopter, launched from a mother ship, in support of an antiSandinista (ARDE) attack on San Juan del Norte, on April 9, 1984. However, the Court was unable to find that U.S. military maneuvers
near the
04
Nicaraguan border had constituted a threat or use of force.1
Second, the ICJ held that the United States had also violated the prohibition of the threat or use of force by the arming and training of the
contras. On the other hand, the mere supply of funds to the contras did
not constitute a use of force in violation of this prohibition, although it
did violate the principle of nonintervention. 105 Significantly, the Court
found that the actions of the contras could not as a whole be treated as
imputable to the United States, despite the high degree of the latter's
involvement in training, equipping, and supporting the contras.106
b. The Principle of Nonintervention
Focusing primarily on the aspects of intervention involving military
activities, the World Court found it "clearly established" that "the United
States intended, by its support of the contras, to coerce the Government
of Nicaragua in respect of matters in which each State is permitted, by
the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely"l 0 7-including, for
example, "the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system,
and the formulation of foreign policy."1 0 8 Finding that the contras' aim
was the overthrow of the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, and that
support of a group with such a goal, regardless of whether a state's own
103. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, paras. 80, 227.
104. Id.at paras. 80, 81, 86, 227.
105. Id.at para. 228.
106. This finding was based on a very close reading of the facts as revealed by the evidence
made available to the Court. Id. at paras. 93-115.
107. Id.at para. 241.
108. Id.at para. 205.
FALL 1986

1276

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

objective was merely coercion or the overthrow of another government,
was inadmissible,l 0 9 the World Court held that
the support given by the United States, up to the end of September, 1984, to
the military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua, by financial
support, training, supply of weapons, intelligence and logistic support, constitutes a clear breach of the principle of non-intervention. 110

With respect to the provision of so-called "humanitarian assistance"
to the contras after August 1985, the Court noted that it had no information
on how the August 1985 legislation had been implemented. It did state,
however, what it considered to be the applicable law. First, in order not
to constitute unlawful intervention, "humanitarian assistance" must be
limited to the purposes pursued in the practice of the International Red
Cross, i.e., "to prevent and alleviate human suffering" and "to protect
life and health and to ensure respect for the human being." Second, "it
must also, and above all, be given without discrimination to all in need
in Nicaragua, not merely to the contras and their dependents." III At the
same time, the Court clearly suggested, in a brief comment, that the
provision of intelligence information to the contras would violate the
principle of nonintervention.' 12
While the Court found that United States support of the contras represented a clear violation of the principle of nonintervention, it also held,
quite interestingly, that none of the economic measures taken by the U.S.
against Nicaragua and complained of by the latter-i.e., a cut-off in aid,
a reduction in the sugar quota, attempts to block the granting of loans by
international financial institutions, or the general trade embargo imposed
on May 1, 1985-violated the principle of nonintervention prohibiting
interference in Nicaragua's internal affairs. 113 Though of minor interest
in the present case, this holding was one of major importance as a statement of the present customary law duty of nonintervention.
c. Other Principles of Customary International Law
The World Court found that the actions which violated the foregoing
principles regarding the non-use of force and nonintervention also violated
the principle of respect for state sovereignty which was a fundamental
norm of customary international law. In addition to these violations, cer109. Id. at paras. 239-41.
110. Id. at para. 242. Worth noting is the Court's factual finding that the U.S. had continued
its support of the contras until Sept. 1984, i.e., some four months after the Court's Order
of Interim Protection of May 10, 1984. Cf. infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text (ICJ's
statements regarding Order of Interim Protection).
I 11. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, at paras. 242-43.
112. Id. at para. 243. See supra note III and accompanying text.
113. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, at paras. 244-45.
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tain overflights of Nicaraguan territory by U.S. aircraft, including those
114
causing loud sonic booms, were held to have violated this principle,
while the mining of Nicaraguan ports had also violated Nicaragua's cus115
tomary law right of freedom of commerce and maritime communications.
With respect to U.S. responsibility for atrocities committed by the
contras, the Court held that due to the absence of the requisite degree of
direction and control over the specific operations in which such events
occurred, the actions of the contras were not imputable to the United
States.1 16 However, the Court did find that common article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions represented customary international law, and that
the U.S. also had a duty under customary international law to "respect"
and even "to ensure respect ... in all circumstances" for the principles
of humanitarian law embodied in article 3 common to the four conventions. 117 This duty it had breached, the Court held, by publishing and
disseminating a psychological warfare manual for the use of the contras
which advocated violations of the essential provisions of humanitarian
law contained in common article 3.118
Moreover, the United States had also violated its duty under customary
international law to notify shipping of its mining operations, thus disregarding the "elementary considerations of humanity" invoked by the
Court in its 1949 Corfu Channel decision.1 9 Finally, the ICJ found that
the U.S. had violated its duty under customary international law not to
defeat the object and purpose of its 1956 FCN Treaty with Nicaragua.
and
The direct attacks on ports and oil installations, mining operations,
120
the economic embargo were held to have violated this duty.
5. Violations of the FCN Treaty
Nicaragua had also charged the United States with violation, through
the actions referred to above, of the 1956 U.S.-Nicaragua FCN Treaty.
In view of its holding that the actions of the contras were not imputable
to the United States, the Court rejected the charge that, in contravention
of article I of the Treaty, the U.S. had failed to provide "equitable treatment" to Nicaraguans by, among other things, killing them through the

114. Id. at paras. 251. See id. at paras. 87-91.
115. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, at para. 253. While the Court did not so
hold because it was not asked to do so, its opinion suggests that the rights of third states
were also violated by the mining of Nicaraguan ports and harbors. See id. at paras. 214,
253.
116. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, paras. 115, 216, 254.
117. Id. at paras. 219-20.
118. Id. at paras. 254-55.
119. Id.at para. 215.
120. Id. at paras. 275-76.
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actions of the contras. 12' However, the Court did find that U.S. mining
of Nicaraguan ports and the trade embargo had violated Nicaragua's rights,
under article XIX of the Treaty, to freedom of communication and
commerce. 122
With respect to a proviso in article XXI(l) (d) excepting from the Treaty
measures necessary to protect the "essential security interests" of the
parties, the Court, eschewing the possibility of a restrictive interpretation
of this term,S23 held simply that the mining operations, "direct" attacks,
and economic embargo could not be deemed as having been necessary to
protect the essential security interests of the United States. Consequently,
article XXI(l)(d) provided no defense against holding that the United
States had committed the violations of the FCN Treaty referred to above. 124
6. Justificationof Collective Self-Defense
The United States legal justification for its actions, advanced in earlier
stages of the proceedings, was that its actions had been fully justified as
acts undertaken in exercise of the right of collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The Court, after finding
that such a right of collective self-defense existed under customary law, 125
proceeded to define with some precision the conditions necessary for the
lawful exercise of that right.
First, it held that an "armed attack" was a prerequisite for any exercise
of the right of self-defense. 126 Second, with respect to collective selfdefense, it declared that the state that was a victim of an armed attack
must form and declare the view that it has been so attacked, and that it
must also formulate a request for assistance from another state in responding to that attack, before the latter's actions could be justified as
an exercise of the right of collective self-defense. '27 Moreover, the traditional requirements of necessity and proportionality must also be met. 128

121. Id. at para. 277.
122. Id. at paras. 277-79.
123. The provision might have been interpreted as referring to the applicability of certain
most-favored-nation and nondiscrimination clauses of the treaty, without reaching a construction that would exclude violations of international law from the scope of the treaty.

Such a restrictive construction would appear to be correct, particularly in view of article
103 of the U.N. Charter which provides that the rights and obligations contained in the
latter shall prevail over any conflicting provisions found in other treaties. As the multilateral
treaty reservation did not apply to construction of the FCN Treaty, article 103 could have
been invoked; however, the Court was apparently of the view that it need not reach that
issue.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note I, paras. 280-82.
Id. at para. 176.
Id. at para. 195.
Id. at paras. 193-200.
Id. at para. 194.
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Applying these conditions to the case at hand, the Court found that
there had been no armed attack by Nicaragua against El Salvador. Even
assuming that the Nicaraguan government had itself been responsible for
the shipment of arms to El Salvador, a conclusion which it was unable
to reach on the basis of the evidence before it, the Court held that such
shipments would not constitute an armed attack.129 Neither Costa Rica
nor Honduras had requested U.S. assistance in exercise of the right of
collective self-defense, the ICJ found; nor did it appear that El Salvador
had made such a request before mid-1984. With respect to the requirements of necessity and proportionality, the Court held that no necessity
for the use of force appeared to exist in December 1981 (when U.S.
support of the contras began), while certain actions such as the mining
of Nicaraguan harbors and "direct" U.S. attacks on oil installations and
1 30
ports violated the proportionality requirement.
7. Other Possible.Justificationsof U.S. Actions

In discharging its duties under article 53 of its statute, the World Court
also examined additional arguments that might have been invoked to excuse U.S. actions. First, and most important, the Court held that U.S.
intervention against Nicaragua could not be justified as a third-state countermeasure (formerly referred to as a reprisal). Thus, even if Nicaragua
had intervened illegally in El Salvador (e.g., by itself furnishing arms and
other assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas), there was no right of collective intervention in response under existing customary international
law. 13' This holding has important implications regarding the admissibility
of countermeasures by third states, which, however, will not be examined
here.
Second, the ICJ held that the pledges made by the Sandinistas (FSLN)
to the Organization of American States in 1979 did not involve a legal
undertaking. 132 Even if they had, it would be the OAS, not the United
States, which would be responsible for monitoring compliance with them;
in any event, the U.S. could not use force or any other means the OAS
itself could not employ in order to ensure compliance. 133 The Court,
moreover, stated unequivocally that there was no basis in international
134
law for any purported right of what it termed "ideological intervention."
Noting that Nicaragua was a party to various human rights treaties
including the American Convention on Human Rights, and that the Inter129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

paras. 164, 230.
paras. 232-37.
paras. 201, 210-11, 246-49.
para. 261.
para. 262.
paras. 263-65.
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American Commission on Human Rights had twice carried out investigations in Nicaragua, demonstrating that the enforcement machinery established under the convention was functioning, the Court concluded:
In any event, while the United States might form its own appraisal of the
situation as to human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the
appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect. With respect to the
measures actually taken, the protection of human rights, a strictly humanitarian
objective, cannot be compatible with the mining of ports, the destruction of oil
installations, or again with the training, arming and equipping of the contras. 135
As in the case of third-state countermeasures, this holding has broad
implications which, however, will not be explored here.
Finally, the Court observed that there were no principles of customary
international law regulating the level of armaments a state might establish,
unless, of course, it entered into agreements establishing such limitations.
Thus the "militarization" of Nicaragua did not afford the United States
136
with any legal defense for its actions.
8. Other Holdings
In conclusion, the World Court recalled to the parties the injunctions
contained in its Interim Protection Order of May 10, 1984. While not
137
it
directly referring to the issue of U.S. compliance with that order,
did stress that "it is incumbent on each party to take the Court's indications [of provisional measures] seriously into account, and not to direct
138
its conduct solely by reference to what it believes to be its rights.'
This appeared to be an oblique reference to the rather extreme reliance
placed by the United States on its collective self-defense justification in
the face of the Court's Order of May 10, 1984, under circumstances in
which the validity of the argument was obviously open to serious doubt.
After reminding the parties of their obligation under customary international law to seek a peaceful resolution of the dispute between them,
the Court suggested that a renewed emphasis on the search for peace
within "the Condadora Process" would be desirable and in keeping with
39
this obligation. 1

135. Id. at paras. 267-68.
136. Id. at para. 269.
137. One of the Court's factual findings, however, suggested that the U.S. had violated
the Order from May to Sept., 1984. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. At the same
time, while withholding judgment on the issue of whether the U.S. had violated the Order
by actions carried out pursuant to legislation adopted in August 1985, in view of its lack of
information regarding such actions, the Court made it clear that such actions would, if
carried out, be in violation of customary international law. See supra notes 110-12 and
accompanying text.
138. Judgment of June 27, 1986, supra note 1, paras. 286-89.
139. Id. at paras. 290-91.
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9. The Dispositive Clauses and the Corresponding Votes
In the sixteen subparagraphs of paragraph 292 of the decision, the judges
of the Court summarized and recorded their specific holdings and the
corresponding votes on each. Of greatest importance, the Court, by a
vote of 12-3, decided "that the United States of America is under a duty
immediately to cease and refrain from all such acts as may constitute
breaches of the foregoing legal obligations."14 0 The Court also held that
the United States owed reparation to Nicaragua for breaches of its international legal obligations toward that state, and that determination of the
amount of damages would be reserved for a subsequent stage of the

proceedings. 141
While consideration of the dissenting opinions in the World Court's
142
Judgment of June 27, 1986 is beyond the scope of the present article,
the fact that the Court spoke with a strong majority was sure to give its
judgment the greatest possible authority.
V. Arguments for Ignoring the Judgment on the Merits
A.

THE ATTACK ON THE COURT

In withdrawing from further proceedings on the merits of the case on
January 18, 1985,143 the United States declared that, "The Court's Judgment of November 26, 1984, finding that it has jurisdiction, is contrary to
law and fact,"' 144 and asserted that "[T]he Court decided-in spite of the
overwhelming evidence before it-that it does have jurisdiction. . . . This
decision is erroneous as a matter of law and is based on a misreading
45
and distortion of the evidence and precedent. . . ." (emphasis added).1
The statement suggested that the Court had acted on the basis of political
and not legal considerations. The United States stated:

140. Id. at para. 292(12).
141. Id. at paras. 292, 292(15).

142. Judge Schwebel's dissenting opinion sets forth in great detail the many issues of
fact and law with respect to which he disagreed with the Court. His opinion is nearly as
long as that of the Court, with a factual appendix as long as his dissent. See Judgment of
June 27, 1986, supra note 1,(Schwebel, J., dissenting). Judges Oda and Sir Robert Jennings

also wrote dissenting opinions. In addition, Judges Lachs, Ruda, Elias, Ago, Sette-Camara
and Ni appended separate opinions of varying length to that of the Court. See id.
143. U.S.

Department of State, Observations on the International Court of Justice's

Judgment on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in the Case of Nicaragua v. United States of
America, supra note 6, at 24 I.L.M. 249, 250, 79 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 423, 424.

144. U.S. Department of State, Statement on U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings
Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, Jan. 18, 1985, supra note 6, at
246.
145. ld. at 246-47.
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The decision of November 26 represents an overreaching of the Court's limits,
a departure from its tradition of judicial restraint, and a risky venture into
treacherouspolitical waters. We have seen in the United Nations, in the last
decade or more, how international organizations have become more and more
politicized against the interests of the Western democracies. It would be a
tragedy if these trends were to infect the International Court of Justice. We
hope this will not happen, because a politicized Court would mean the end of
the Court as a serious, respected institution. Such a result would do grievous
harm to the goal of the rule of law (emphasis added). 146

This attack 47 was continued on October 7, 1985, when the United
States announced that it would withdraw from the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ.1 48 In a State Department "Press Statement" of that date, the

Reagan administration justified this action on several grounds. These included the fact that fewer than one-third of the world's nations had ac-

cepted the ICJ's jurisdiction, contrary to United States expectations in
1946. Reiterating its disagreement with the Court's Judgment of November
26, 1984, it asserted, "Nor, in our judgment, has Nicaragua." More importantly, the State Department declared:
In 1946 we accepted the risks of our submitting to the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction because we believed that the respect owed to the Court by other
states and the Court's own appreciation of the need to adhere scrupulously to
its properjudicial role, would prevent the Court's processfrom being abused
for political ends. These assumptionshave now proved wrong (emphasis added).

"As a result," the statement continued, the President had concluded that
continuation of United States acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ "would be contrary to the principle of 149
the equal application of
the law and would endanger our vital interests."
In justification of the earlier United States withdrawal from participation
in the proceedings on the merits, the State Department affirmed the
following:
Neither the rule of law nor the search for peace in Central America would have
been served by further United States participation. The objectives of the ICJ
to which we subscribe-the peaceful adjudication of international disputes-

146. Id. at 248.

147. Regarding the statement of January 18, 1985, see Franck, Icy Day at the ICJ, 79
INT'L L. 379 (1985); Malloy, supra note 1, at 89-91.
148. The United States formally served notice, effective six months from that date, of
its withdrawal from the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Note
from Secretary of State George P. Shultz to the Secretary General of the United Nations,
Oct. 7, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985) (notice of withdrawal from compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ).
149. U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Oct. 7, 1985, reprinted in 24 I.L.M.
1743, 1743-45 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Press Statement of Oct. 7, 1985] (statement regarding withdrawal from compulsory jurisdiction of ICJ). With respect to "equal application
of the law," it should be noted that under the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ the United
States would be subject to suit only by states accepting the same obligation.
AM. J.
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were being subverted by the efforts of Nicaragua and its Cuban and Soviet
sponsors to use the Court as a political weapon. Indeed, the Court itself has
never seen fit to accept jurisdiction over any other political conflict involving
ongoing hostilities (emphasis added).

"This action," the United States maintained, "does not signify any diminution of our traditional commitment to international law and the International Court of Justice in performing its properJunctions" (emphasis
added). The statement concluded with the affirmation that the United
States would continue to use the Court when its jurisdiction was based
on article 36(1) of the statute, pursuant to treaties and to ad hoc special
agreements submitting specific cases to the Court for decision. 150 Thus
the United States' commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of
disputes through international adjudication reverted to the minimal acceptance of that principle mandated by the United Nations Charter and
15
the annexed Statute of the International Court of Justice. '
The October 7 statement continued the attack on the authority and
integrity of the Court, which was judged to have failed in its duty "to
adhere scrupulously to its proper judicial role." This statement continued
a major theme of the United States statements on January 18, 1985, and
suggested the line of attack upon the Court which might be expected if
and when the United States decided to ignore a final adverse decision by
the ICJ on the merits.
B.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS

Two other arguments that have been advanced by legal scholars could
be used by the Reagan administration in an attempt to justify U.S. nonobservance of the final judgment of the World Court. First, it has been
argued that, "Under the recognized principle in international law of exces
de pouvoir, decisions of an international legal tribunal that exceed its
jurisdiction are void."' 152 Even this doctrine, however, requires that the
irregularity must be manifest, a condition which is not met in the present
case. 153 The exc~s de pouvoir argument seems to overlook article 36(6)
of the statute of the ICJ which gives the Court authority to settle any

150. Id. at 1744-45.
151. For a critique of the U.S. withdrawal from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ
and the statement made at that time, see Gardner, U.S. Termination of the Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 42 (1986).

152. Moore, supra note I. at 96-99.
153. Given the detailed reasoning of the Court in its Judgment of Nov. 26, 1984, and that
eleven members of the International Court of Justice voted in favor of even the most disputed
holding, the decision cannot be characterized as one "where the Court manifestly overreaches its jurisdiction under article 36(l)-(5)" of its statute, as charged by one scholar. The
change is found in Moore, supra note 1, at 96.
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dispute as to whether it has jurisdiction. Such a decision of the Court
regarding its jurisdiction would seem to be binding under article 94(1) of
the United Nations Charter in which a U.N. Member undertakes to comply with the decision of the ICJ in any case in which it is a party. Moreover,
as a Charter norm, article 94(1) overrides any principle that might be
found in customary international law. 154
The second argument is based on the beginning language of article 51
of the U.N. Charter, which states, "Nothing in the present Charter shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs .. " From this language, one author deduces that
nothing in the Statute of the Court, as well as in the rest of the Charter, can
lawfully serve as the basis for impairing the inherent right of self-defense against
an ongoing armed attack, and the Court cannot lawfully issue an order impairing
this right. 155

This argument fails to make the critical distinction between impairing a
right, on the one hand, and determining its reach and whether or not
action taken in alleged exercise of that right is lawful in fact, on the
other. 156 Such an interpretation would appear to be unfounded. If advanced by the United States as a justification for defying the ICJ's final
judgment on the merits, it would undermine the authority of the Court's
decisions, setting a precedent that could be invoked by any future violator
of international legal norms governing the use of force. 157

154. Professor Reisman has made the same argument based on the doctrine of exces de
pouvoir. See Reisman, Has the World Court Exceeded its
Jurisdiction?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
128 (No.I,1986).
However,both Moore and Reisman seem to have overlooked the existence of article 94(l)
of the United Nations Charter. The International Court of Justice is no ordinary arbitral
tribunal, but rather "the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, U.N. CHARTER art.
92, whose decisions are final and binding on any Member which is a party to the case
decided. U.N. CHARTER art. 94 para. 1.See also I.C.J. STAT. arts. 59-60.
155. Moore, supra note 1,at 99. See also id. at 99-101.
156. See, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNcTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAI
COMMUNITY 177-82. 393-95 (1933). Arts. 36 and 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ clearly confer
authority on the Court "'to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it." I.C.J. STAT., art. 36, art. 38(1) (quoted). See, e.g., U.S. Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran, 1980 I.C.J. 3, 18-22 (Merits).
157. Nor is there any validity to an argument that could be advanced that the Court's
judgment on the merits is not executory unless and until the Security Council acts to enforce
it. The obligation to comply with the decisions of the ICJ established in art. 94(l) is a primary
legal obligation, and is in no sense contingent on action by the Security Council under art.
94(2). See U.N. CHARTER art. 94 para. 1.Art. 94(2) of the Charter provides:
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon itunder ajudgment
rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which
may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken
to give effect to the judgment (emphasis added).
U.N. CHARTER art. 94 para. 2. This provision refers to a facultative power only, and not
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VI. Conclusions
The World Court's decisions in Nicaraguav. U.S. and initial indications
from the United States that it does not intend to comply with the ICJ's
judgment on the merits raise important questions about whether the Court
has acted improperly, whether the United States is justified in not complying with its judgment on the merits, and what are the implications of
continued U.S. noncompliance with the Court's Judgment of June 27,
1986.
These questions are sure to be the subject of continuing scholarly and
political debate, and not only in the United States. Indeed, it is difficult
to imagine that these issues will not remain on the political agendas of
both the United States and other states so long as the United States
continues its current policies toward Nicaragua.
Three categories of issues are of particular importance: (1) the content
of the substantive norms of international law governing the use of force,
intervention, and the right of individual or collective self-defense; (2) the
question of whether the ICJ's judgment on the merits is legally binding
on the United States; and (3) the implications of U.S. noncompliance with
the Court's Judgment of June 27, 1986.
First, with respect to the substantive norms of international law governing the use of force and intervention in the internal affairs of another
state, it must be recognized that the Court's statements in Nicaragua v.
U.S. are formally limited in their applicability to the present dispute 158
and they refer only to the corresponding principles of customary international law. Nonetheless, statements of the Court are generally viewed
by the majority of publicists or experts in public international law as the
most authoritative statement of the principles of customary international
law involved. It is also likely that the corresponding norms in the United
Nations Charter and other conventions, including the OAS Charter, will
be interpreted as including, at a minimum, the specific requirements enunciated by the Court in its statement of the customary law governing the
threat or use of force, intervention, self-defense and related matters.
These considerations are important because they will directly influence
perceptions by many governments and experts in international law of the
legality-and hence the legitimacy-of a government's actions in a given
to a condition precedent to the binding effect of an ICJ judgment.
Significantly, Charles E. Redman. a State Department spokesman, when asked after the
Court's merits decision about the possibility of the Court ordering the United States to pay
damages to Nicaragua, replied: "The Court's decisions are not self-enforcing. It doesn't
have the power to order anything." Washington Post, June 28, 1986, at A14, col. 2. See
supra note 69.
158. See I.C.J. STAT. art. 59.
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case. Specifically, they are likely to influence perceptions of the legitimacy
of U.S. actions vis- -vis Nicaragua. Such perceptions tend to have broader
implications for the eventual success of a nation's foreign policy, both
generally and with respect to particular subjects or areas.
The second category of issues-whether the World Court's Judgment
of June 27, 1986 is legally binding on the United States-are of critical
and far-reaching importance. On the one hand, critics of the Court's
decisions in the present case argue that the Court exceeded its jurisdiction
by deciding that Nicaragua accepted the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction
under article 36(2) and (5) of the Court's statute, by failing to give full
effect to the multilateral treaty reservation contained in the U.S. declaration accepting the Court's jurisdiction under article 36(2), or by proceeding to adjudicate a claim which by its nature was inadmissible or
nonjusticiable because it involved an ongoing armed conflict, or was a
matter to be properly decided by the Security Council.
On the other hand, article 36(6) of the statute of the Court provides
that in the event of a dispute as to its jurisdiction, the Court shall decide
the matter. Moreover, article 94(1) of the United Nations Charter on its
face requires U.S. compliance with the Court's judgment on the merits.
In the present case, the International Court of Justice gave careful consideration to each of the arguments reflected in the criticisms referred to
above, and by a large majority decided that it did have jurisdiction to
decide Nicaragua's claims. Then, despite the nonappearance of the U.S.
in the merits phase of the proceedings, it weighed the factual and legal
arguments that might have been advanced by the U.S., before reaching
its final decision on the merits. It found, by a majority of 12-3, that the
United States had breached its obligations under customary international
law norms governing the use of force, intervention, and collective selfdefense. By votes of 14-1, it found that the U.S. had also breached
specific obligations under the FCN Treaty.
In deciding whether the Court's decision on the merits is legally binding
on the United States, one must consider whether the authoritative legal
process established prior to the present dispute, with the active participation and leadership of the United States, is somehow flawed. More
important, one must consider whether it is ever appropriate for one party
to a dispute before the Court to unilaterally decide whether or not the
Court's decisions are so flawed as to remove the legal obligation under
article 94(1) of the charter to comply with its decisions.
In seeking to answer these questions, it is helpful to focus in particular
on the Court's decision that the U.S. had violated the FCN Treaty. Exercising jurisdiction under the compromissory clause in the Treaty and
article 36(1) of the statute of the Court, the Court decided that the United
States had violated the FCN Treaty and owed Nicaragua reparation for
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such violations. Here, neither Nicaraguan acceptance of the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2) and (5), nor the U.S. multilateral
treaty reservation was at issue, whereas the Court decided it had jurisdiction by a vote of 14-2 and that the U.S. had violated the Treaty by
votes of 14-1 and 12-3. If the United States is not bound by article 94(1)
of the U.N. Charter to comply with even this part of the judgment on the
merits, a persuasive legal argument, not yet heard, must be advanced.
The ultimate question that must be addressed, therefore, is whether the
jurisdiction of the World Court can ever be truly compulsory-either under
article 36(1) or article 36(2) of its Statute-if a party to a dispute before
the Court may unilaterally determine that the Court has exceeded its
powers or otherwise acted improperly.
The third category of questions concerns the implications of noncompliance by the United States with the ICJ's judgment on the merits. One
implication is that, given the broad nature of the charges leveled against
the Court by the U.S., other states may follow the lead of the United
States in "rejecting" the jurisdiction of the World Court and refusing to
comply with an adverse judgment on the merits. 159 A second implication
is that international law may come to be viewed by top decisionmakers
as even more irrelevant than it has been viewed in the past, particularly
if the United States is seen as acting in flagrant violation of international
law in its conduct toward Nicaragua with apparent impunity. Moreover,
if the United States endorses such conduct through its own behavior, one
should not be surprised if other nations follow its example in the future.
There are, of course, many further implications of U.S. noncompliance
with the Court's decision, which will not be considered here. But the
basic question remains as to whether nations should be bound by international law when they consider their vital interests to be at issue, or
when in their view a dispute is of a "political" rather than a "legal"
nature. Interestingly, this same issue was the subject of intense debate at
the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899. The effort to create a World
Court foundered then, though it became a reality following World War I.
By 1945, and another world war, the United States was ready to join the
Court, even accepting its compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2) in
1946. Yet, some forty years later, and notwithstanding the great strides
that have been made in the development of international law and legal
159. Nicaragua filed an application in the ICJ against both Costa Rica and Honduras on
1986, at A-, col. -. Honduras "rejected" the
July 28, 1986. Washington Post, July -,
Court's jurisdiction several days later. Washington Post, July 31, 1986, at A28, col. I. The
Honduran "rejection" was decided upon notwithstanding the fact that Nicaragua and Honduras had both indisputably accepted the Court's jurisdiction under Article 36(2) as of the

date of the application, and the absence in the Honduran declaration of acceptance of any
multilateral treaty reservation.
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institutions, this fundamental question remains unresolved, at least on the
political level, in some quarters.
If international lawyers are to contribute to efforts to strengthen the
influence of international law in world affairs, they must come to terms
with the full implications of the present crisis and, with conviction and
all of their persuasive talents, engage broader political sectors in the
debate over the importance of international law. In view of the developments described in this article, international lawyers need to focus on
the vision of the world they would like to help achieve, and the kinds of
policies and actions that might logically lead toward that result. 160

160. As this article goes to press, the United States vetoed the UN Security Council's
resolution which reaffirmed the authority of the ICJ. The resolution called on all nations to

comply with the June 27, 1986 decision of the Court and to refrain from any political,
economic or military action that might impede the peace efforts of the Contadora nations.
It did not condemn nor mention the United States by name. No other nation on the 15member council joined with the United States, eleven nations supported the resolution.
Great Britain, France and Thailand abstained on the final vote.
Vernon A. Walters, the chief U.S. representative to the UN, said that the United States
had vetoed the resolution because it "could not, and would not, contribute to the achievement of a peaceful and just settlement of the situation in Central America." L.A. Times,
Aug. 2, 1986, Pt. V, at 4, cols. 1-2 (Editorial).
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